Radomir Bogdanov:

any presentation. All people present here know his name, and are quite aware of his very noble activities, his very courageous, a number of courageous acts of his life which makes his life a legend. And we hope that you will feel here, well it is among friends -- you can be quite frank, and you can be satisfied and quite sure that you are really among friends, sharing your views, your ideas and going the same way as you are going. So before you start your lecture I would like to ask Dr. Flikanov (2) to say something about your biography, which is a story by itself. I have read it, but not everybody present knows about some facts of your very interesting life.

ELLSBERG: One thing. Could I encourage anyone to fill up the empty sears? I like to see the friendly faces personally.

MAN: Oh yes, yes. Oh yes, all right.

[BACKGROUND DISCUSSION]

PICKARONY: Well, I'll try to be brief, although it's very difficult to be brief about Daniel Ellsberg. His name was associated with <a href="#">The</a>
<a href="#">Pentagon Papers</a>, and I must say in all sadness that among the younger generation of researchers here even that doesn't ring a bell. But still <a href="#">The Pentagon Papers</a> -- Daniel Ellsberg is far, far more than just that incident. He was born in 1931 in Chicago. Went to Harvard.

After that he joined the Marines. I believe he volunteered for the Marines. Didn't you? He was a dedicated Marine, a real leather-neck. After that he went to the Rand Corporation and worked on nuclear warfare. He was an economist by education, but at that time the tendency was growing in American strategic circles to bring some rationality into nuclear warfare, and they thought that economists were just the right kind of profession for that. In connection with that he was consultant to the Pentagon since 1951 and he had the -- he had the responsibility of drafting the first nuclear guidance of the Kennedy Administration. That is he was responsible for targeting American nuclear weapons on the Soviet Union.

VOICE: Thenks & lot.

ELLSBERG: For withdrawing the targets.

DR. FLIKANOV: Yeah. Yes, because as he describes in his talks often, the kind of nuclear guidance that existed before him was much worse than the one that he put there. Anyway, that was -- the idea was to bring some rationality into the business of nuclear warfare. He was a consultant to the Pentagon on several issues. He was there when decisions were made during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He was the man on the spot. He was 30 years old and he had some knowledge which others didn't and so he was brought into the situation so to say. And he took part in that. In '64 - '65, he began consulting the Pentagon on the business of the Vietnam War, another attempt to bring some rationality into a fundamentally irrational business. And that conflict between irrational and rational, it is my interpretation of of his evolution as a person, had something to do with his becoming

a dedicated opponent of war, of nuclear weapons, a dedicated fighter for peace. In '71, he had published The Pentagon Papers, the documents which he on his own responsibility xeroxed the internal documents of the U.S. government which had to do with the which had to do with why the War was planned, how it was with to escalate the decision and so on and so forth. Because of that he was brought to trial. And that started the confrontation between him and the person who was addressing us here on Monday, Richard Nixon.  $\mathcal{H}_{\mathrm{And}}$ you might notice that hadn't it been for the Pentagon publication of The Pentagon Papers there might have been no Watergate. There minkt have taken a different course. That was the key event, the publishing of the Pentagon Papers. Well, the situation was such that Daniel Ellsberg won. He didn't go to jail. And Richard Nixon lost and had to leave the Presidency. And the Vietnamese won.

Well, that was a long time ago. Now the struggle is around different issues -- the issues of nuclear policy. And Daniel Ellsberg is one of those people who not only advocate nuclear disarmament, but who are risking their lives to stop nuclear testing in the United States. On April 8, this year, when our moratorium was expiring, he and several other people went to the Nevada Test Site, right there, trying to get as close to the epicenter, to the ground zero, as possible, in order to delay the testing. They knew that they wouldn't be able to prevent it, but they knew that they could delay if for at least some time. Because if they could delay -- if they could send a message to the American people and to the Congress

from my point of view, or advantage, from Reagan's point of view, of permitting the emergence and preservation of instability.

Build-down, in total numbers, while accompanied by a build-up of defstabilizing first-strike prefemptive accurate forces which is ( corrent proposals imply what it implies, is the fastest route to instability. In fact, it if you are going to add forces like the D-5, which are de+stabilizing, it is further de+stabilizing to subtract forces like Poseidon. That is precisely what Reagan is doing. #In fact, in his first year in office, Reagan saved money by getting rid of what? Poseidon submarines, before SALT II required him to do it. Odd, he didn't seem obsessed by saving money in the defense budget. Why this obsession with saving money before he had to do it? Odd, that he should choose for destruction, which would be compatable with build-down, the most (were not vulnerable and that stabilizing forces in the U.S. category, forces that did not threaten offensive Yet he proceeded to 25k money for MX in fixed silos, Soviet first strike forces. Let me suggest two reasons for that, one has the of which would seem so sinister that without my full analysis, I don't opposite think you could credit it, but perhaps you can. The Poseidon had two Enerecteristic fromor the point of view of centrin Pentagon 202/4sts. disadvantages for Reagan. The first, from his prefemptive point of view, is that it did not offer him a threat against Soviet first forces. Since Therefore, it didn't serve that purpose, it could be dispensed with. Let me give another point which is subtle, and probably, let us say admit, szy, Richard Perle. too subtle for Reagan, but not too subtle for Pearl. It was invulnerable. That is a disadvantage if what you want is a threat. The MX's vulnerability in fixed silos is an advantage, given the actual strategic mission of Scowerost The Skullcroft (?) Commission actually said in its report, that the purpose of the MX was not to limit damage in a war, but to deter attack on the United States,

furnish extended deterrance, a little noticed comment, to threaten, in (The report did not point out explicitly that vulnerability served this purpose, other words, a first strike in the event of a war in Europe. Which does but 1et's that better? An MX that is mobile, like the Trident 2, let's say, and just (cannot be targeted by the SS-18 and) which could be withheld in the event of a crisis, or used, or an MX 23K: (or possible felse elermo) which is so vulnerable that it poses the threat that if we get in a ( be pressed crisis we will have to use this or we will lose it. Its vulnerability Perle's is an advantage from that point of view. And I think that, in Pearl's thought eyes and others, that permitted them to do what would otherwise seem and totally unrewarding. very, very dangerous, Carter thought was very dangerous. Harold Brown thought it was dangerous. But Pearl, somehow, didn't think it was felt was worth running. quite so dangerous. It was the kind of risk he had to run.

So I'm saying, build-down precisely encourages this kind of "trade-up"

— Poseidon for MX—

reductions, and should be treated by the Soviet Union as precisely the

lure and the trap that past actions have been.

MAN: Thank you. Other questions?

MAN: What will happen if the Soviet Union does not follow the United States and rejects this approach? [INAUDIBLE]

ELLSBERG: Very relevant question, pertinent question. I understand your question very well. I also want to comment, to give you an historical example that I think will benefit. First, let me answer your question directly. I'm going to suggest something that I suspect is such a heresy over here, I may be wrong, but I suspect it is, that I wouldn't have ventured to introduce it if I hadn't spent an hour preparing for it in a way. I was in the Pentagon during the Cuban Missle Crisis, as

was announced. Obviously, the world was not safe, it was unsafe at that time. I disagree with you, however, that it was less safe than the present.

MAN: I didn't say that.

ELLSBERG: Oh, I thought you did.

MAN: "...was much safer."

ELLSBERG: Oh, much safer. Well, again, the present is, I think, not what we need to focus on so much. The weapons I'm talking about, remember, really have not been deployed yet. And it takes some years. The situation I have really pointed to as the situation of danger is some five years from now. And, by the way, I should mention also, imagine adding SDI to the situation I've described. There's no question that makes everything more dangerous. A world with some SDI in it, plus the developments I'm talking about, some five or six years from now—and these are all programmed, we can see us moving toward that. That's a world in which, I do say, you may disagree, but I do say I regard as definitely more dangerous than at present, more dangerous than five years ago, and more dangerous than twenty years ago. Now that is saying a lot, because the world was dangerous 25 years ago. And it was natural for the Soviets to feel very compelled to find a way out of the dangers of that world.

I'm ready to suggest now, I hope not too offensively, given my reasoning, at least, that the Soviet errors, totally understandable, began

as early as that, for this reason. Let's say first, what were their alternatives? Remember that what was done was pretty much to imitate the U.S. forces, and strive for numerical parody. There were two alternatives to that. Let me say three alternatives, if I may. One was, simply, to stick to the forces you then had, and, by the way, I don't mean what was operational in '62, but what was becoming operational. You had about 70 weapons under construction in 1962. I'm giving you some history here. Did you know that, actually?

MAN: [INAUDIBLE]

ELLSBERG: Did you hear here? It helps to know the history of ones own country. And that is as difficult in these matters in the U.S. as here, to a large extent. Secrecy deprives us of the knowledge that is necessary to wisdom, in both countries. That is why I have taken some risk to declassified some of this information in my own country.

You were getting about 70 weapons, going toward 100, 200, and so forth. Supposing you had simply stuck with that. That would not pose a first strike threat to the U.S. ever. On the other hand, it would confront the U.S. with very sizable, by historic standards, retaliation, whatever the U.S. did. The U.S. could greatly reduce those forces by a first strike, but not to zero, and knew it. It would not, I say, be the best situation, but better than we're getting, even that, better than we're getting. And what we're moving toward.

OK, another situation, I would say, better than that. To produce hardened forces, the Soviet Union began to harden its missiles in 1967, I believe, planned before that, of course. By '68 or '69, had a sizable

number of hardened forces, by which the time the U.S. still, of course, had great numerical superiority. Actually, in '69, they were rather equal. But the U.S. was about to get a numerical superiority with MIRV. That situation, I would say, is quite stable, even if the U.S. had later improved its accuracy. This depends on kinds of calculations that affect military, and as an historian, you may not be as familiar with those calculations. And they may be quite foolish. As a human, you are not losing much in the way of wisdom to be ignorant of those calculations, except that, unfortunately, they impress generals, and that affects history.

OK, I would say, then, had the Soviets simply stuck with what they had in about '68 or '69, the world would remain very stable no matter what the U.S. did, even with SDI. Because confronting those forces, you wouldn't have parity numerically, but the U.S. would have no ability to threaten a first use, couldn't threaten it. And would be unlikely to strike first. That's better than the first, I would say, and better than that.

But now let me give you a third that was much better. And that was to strive for a cut-off early on. Strive for a cut-off in the production of forces. Strive, above all, to avoid MIRV. We could talk about the history, but that could have been done. By achieving a ban on MIRV in '68 or '69, both sides would have avoided it, and you would have numerical parity. A ban on MIRV as late as '73, '74, '75, '76 -- I should say, not on MIRV, but on flight testing, flight testing that improved accuracy, I meant to say -- would have left the world either with parity or with Soviet inferiority in numbers, but very stable

forever, basically. That would have been highly desireable. The Soviets missed that chance, even though they were already in the arms control process. They were talking. They mentioned MIRVs, but not with emphasis and not in a way likely to achieve it. They didn't offer much. What I'm really saying is, the Soviets, in my opinion, seeking stability, should have sought a ban on MIRV, even if they gave up numerical equality, even with inferiority. That was of no importance. They should have done everything they could to educate the public, educate Congress, educate -- and there they had a receptive audience, at least in McNamara. They lost it with Nixon. But they still had Congress to do that. That was a major missed opportunity historically.

We could go further. As I've implied, there were later problems. Could have avoided the SS-18 accuracy, unilaterally, could have sought the ban over and over, and could do it now. The Soviets talk about responding appropriately to U.S. initiatives. We have done so in the past, we will do so in the future. You recognize that statement? The U.S. puts the Pershing 2 into Europe, very threatening development. Soviet response is to put SS-21s and -22s in Germany. Not what I call "appropriate response" from the point of view of stability. That means I don't take for granted that future responses will be appropriate without critical view. So I am saying, then, that not that the situation was acceptable or tolerable in '62 or '64, but that the measure of our current dangers is that it is even worse. And that the whole parity build-up, as opposed to alternatives, was not just a waste of money, in many ways. And it was not dangerous for the first ten years or so, but has become dangerous.

Now, if I may, a very last important point that should appeal to an historian. In the days before systems analysis, but not, unfortunately, before general staffs -- and I should say, by the way, general staffs have always, and in the U.S., been far more important and influential than systems analysts at Rand, or anywhere else. In the days, then, of advanced general staffs in the late 19th Century and early 20th Century, the preparations were made for the holocaust of World War I, a war that no one wanted, but which came about, I would say, because what general staffs created, given the technology of their day, and given a desire for parity -- and in some cases, superiority -- but they didn't get superiority, they got parity, created exactly the structure of what I'm saying is coming to emerge today. So if you were following -hard, for your background, which is a better background for humanity than mine. But if you found it hard to follow the reasoning that is constructing this today, you will recall, I'm sure, that the characteristic of the technology of World War I put great premium on getting the first move. The Tsar did not want war. The Kaiser did not want war, even Austria did not want a general war, etcetera. The British did not want war. Each had technology and plans based on an understanding that if war came, or was impending, they must mobilize and move first, because of the technology of rail road mobilization. And I'm saying that was a world which was unstable in precisely the same way that I'm describing the world that is emerging. The result was World War I, which should have been a warning to us.

MAN: Let's say I agree with your reasoning, but to my mind, you still base all your reasoning on the military aspects of the problem.

ELLSBERG: That's all I've talked about, yeah.

MAN: Is it possible that everyone did not want the First World War, militarily possibly, but they did want it, economically and politically?

ELLSBERG: A little war, they didn't want what they got.

MAN: A little war would have changed the world according to their wishes, and their wishes were rather grand.

ELLSBERG: Could I describe their ambitions, though, in a way that is a little different, and which applies to the present?

[BACKGROUND NOISES.]

ELLSBERG: Not discounting what you just said, let me add to their aspirations, a very modern one. Each of them wanted to be able to threaten war. Let me bring that up to the present. There are occasionally still statements in Soviet literature which are very plausible, looking at the U.S. preparations. That the U.S. is planning, and some people in the U.S., at least the military, want a war which they expect to win. And they want superiority, and they want a war. I have said they don't expect to get superiority. They want the kind of parity they're going to get. They do not want a war. I don't believe any President, certainly including Reagan, has wanted a nuclear war, either small or large. The tragedy is, unknown to the American public.....

[END SIDE B, BEGINNING OF SIDE 3, TAPE 2. SOME MATERIAL MISSING.]

[WOMAN SPEAKING OVER ELLSBERG'S VOICE.]

.....Obviously, political conflicts, political interests are fundamental as well as psychological, attitudinal. And when I referred to gender differences, that was not just to flatter the women present. I believe, in fact, that certain male characteristics of the male power holders play a rather fundamental aspect in this, crucial to the evolution of these crises. In each case has been the emotion of certain individual males that their pride, their prestige, has been humiliated, and that they "can't do that to me." I could give you many examples. I think that is somewhat more male than female, in tradition, and is a part of the problem. So we could mention all these things.

I'm just saying that the military, which, by the way, is easiest to deal with in the shorter run. You can stop the deployment of SS-24 a lot faster than you can change -- put women in the power structure, or change the way of thinking. But all of that is necessary.

MAN: Any more questions?

WOMAN: [INAUDIBLE]

ELLSBERG: Yes, important question. If I can just follow up that last comment, by the way. I'm impressed by the number of women in this room. Certainly, at Rand in my day there wouldn't have been any. So I think

that's good. Glad to see it.

The anti-war movement, I think, is feeling -- one can distinguish, by the way, let's say, anti-nuclear weapons -- attitudes among the American public as a whole. And the activist organized initiators of demonstrations, lobbying, rallies, civil disobedience, and so forth. I have emphasized a focus on Congressional action in the U.S. at the moment, because I think that is possible. And Congress is alert to this, even though subject to great manipulation by the President, as we saw in the Contra aid vote. The anti-war movement, at the moment, is quite disorganized and discouraged. It is in no way has the public lost interest in this problem, or concern for the problem. But in terms of activism, at the moment, it is very much down, simply not because the fad has passed, but simply because they are highly discouraged in the face of Reagan's intransigence on the policy, to have achieved such a large movement, larger than the Vietnam war movement, much broader than the Vietnam war movement, in social class and in age, and had nothing to show for it on the U.S. side, was very demoralizing. A million people demonstrate in Central Park in June of 1982. Now, actually, there was a response to that. The response was from the Soviet Union. Within the next month, the Soviet Union tabled the formal proposal in Geneva for a freeze. Not one out of a thousand members of the freeze movement is aware that that happened, because the Soviet Union cooperated in Reagan's secrecy on that point. No one in the United States, unless they have read Stroge Talbot's book, which revealed this years later, is aware that the Soviet Union responded officially to the freeze proposal. Everyone is aware that there have been public statements in support of the freeze by various Soviet leaders. But Reagan keeps saying, "But where do we see

their proposals in Geneva? Where is the official proposal?" The fact is there was an official proposal, and it was kept secret by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. That was a mistake, in my opinion, to cooperate in that secrecy. Because it helped demoralize the anti-war movement. Had the moratorium been taken in '82, when I happened to propose it, but new ways of thinking don't move that fast, but when I proposed this in '82, and there was sympathetic reaction to it, had it been done then the response would have been enormous. I have just been with Margaret Brenman-Gibson, here, risking eight months in jail at the Nevada Test Site at Ground Zero. But with half a dozen other people. In '82 it would have been measured in the thousands. I have no doubt of that, '83, less, but still large, '84, less, but still large. By '85, had the Soviets asked me, "What will be the response if we have a moratorium?" I would have said, "I don't know. I hope that it won't be what it would have been three years ago." The movement doesn't exist in that form any more. However, the movement is getting back. Because, basically, of the new way of thinking and the new way of acting, above all, and the Soviets. I would say the low point in my own hopes, approaching total despair, was about last September, around the time of the non-proliferation treaty conference, at which point the Soviet moratorium had been totally ignored by U.S. media. And, therefore, the public didn't even know it existed. My hopes began to rise with the summit, with the new kind of leader we were seeing, the new ability to appeal to the U.S. media, to U.S. public. And it seemed to be a new sort of person here.

The ASAT (?) Moratorium, which in Congress, which required the Soviet prior moratorium, showed that Congress could defy the President,

which I had given up on, in a highly important way. I have been mentioning the test ban moratorium, but the ASAT Moratorium is at least as important, it may be more important, for immediate effects. That showed Congress could move. The extentions of the moratorium, by the Soviet Union, destroyed the myth of Reagan that this was only a propaganda move. It showed much more seriousness. That has gotten through to the American people. The movement is now being re-constituted on the test ban, not on the freeze, but on the test ban, because of Soviet actions. And I emphasize the action on the test ban and ASAT, and the action of extending it, above all. If it is further extended, now I think I can quarantee, not any spectacular result, but a definitely positive result; increased knowledge of the moratorium among the Americans, increased response in Congress. Likewise in the ASAT, and perhaps I should mention, as long as three years ago, I and Chris Payne, and several others in the freeze movement, were pressing three actions on Congress, three: a moratorium on testing of warheads, a moratorium on testing of ASAT, anti-satellite, and a moratorium on the flight testing of new MIRVed missiles. The Soviets started an anti-satellite moratorium, and that was responded to by Congress picking that up, a great success. Reagan, remember, would not have done it, but Congress did do it. Second, the Soviets initiated a test-ban moratorium. That is now getting very positive response in Congress. And I expect a vote, a strong vote, which will probably not win, but which will be strong, in the next few weeks. What I have said today is in the direction of a Soviet initiative in the third element. A moratorium, a limited term moratorium, on the testing and deployment of new MIRVed missiles. That, too, I would hope for a response from Congress.

So, we do have some examples of success in the ASAT field, and I want very much to applaud the Soviet move. And I would say that Gorbachev's leadership, in this respect, is the single, I could say the most hopeful sign in the current situation of getting out of this trap, and more than that it's, in a way, the first hopeful sign that I've seen for a number of years, since Reagan came into office, at least. So, but it has been met by a response, not in the President, but in the public and in Congress.

MAN: There are some further questions I have for you.

ELLSBERG: Yes, I'll try to give shorter answers. I've been giving long answers.

MAN: No problem with long answers.

ELLSBERG: You have no time problem with long answers?

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MAN: So your suggestion is, as I understand, that the Soviet Union should talk over with the United States in the arms race. In this case we have three several alternatives. The first one will be that the United States will continue acquiring the first strike capability. The second alternative is that the United States Congress will stop funding and this would be an opportunity to make peace, to make the world much more stable. From my point of view, the first possibility looks much more real than the second one. What is your judgement?

ELLSBERG: A very good point, and I think I can add to it. By the way, did you say three possibilities? First, I heard two?

MAN: Yes, the third one, which I forgot to mention, can be, for example, U.S. leadership, Reagan, will change their way of thinking. But it's not a good possibility, I doubt it very much.

ELLSBERG: OK, let me -- I think that from an American perspective I can add now some things that will modify those. First of all, what I said justified your paraphrase, but I think I should correct what I said a little bit. I did not mean to imply, simply, that the Soviets quote, should not follow the U.S., unless one understands that to mean "should not follow," this is what I am saying, "the Soviets should not follow in the way they have been following," which is, more or less, to imitate the U.S. developments. And, moreover, to avoid arms control approaches which would avert these developments. The Soviets, there's a lot of negatives there, but I'm saying, the Soviets have, like the U.S., not-even-made proposals that would avert these developments. And I think that's regrettable. So, I'm suggesting, then, not only a change in Soviet responses -- and I'm not saying you shouldn't respond, in a word -- I'm saying you should change the way you respond. And, moreover, you should change your negotiating and arms control approach. And may I ask what that gentleman\s name is, the historian's name again, what was your name?

MAN: Ivanya.

STET

ELLSBERG: Ivanya. That I want to emphasize, in terms of changes on needed on both sides, needed, one could give even priority to measures I haven't spoken of today. I have just, for purposes of time, limited myself to this issue, so there are many other kinds of changes that are needed.

It's clear that when I'm talking about an instability, that means a vulnerability to sparks the trigger it is, of course, also important to reduce such confrontations in a political way, to reduce the conflicts and the sparks that give rise. But I do emphasize military as well, because I don't anticipate a world of great powers where there are no conflicts; a conflict-free environment, as Herman Kahn might have called it. That would be a world in which weapons of the kind we are building would be safe, because there's no conflict. But we're going to have conflicts, whatever we do. And we should reduce them, it's crucial; but we should also reduce the explosiveness of the military situation.

then, that the Soviet Union the premise is not only changes its well-as programs, military, but also its explanations, its education, its stance of rationale to the world, its proposals on the military, and its arms controls initiatives. It changes all those, as well as its military responses. What, then, might happen in the U.S., and what would be the effects?

One would be that despite its proposals, and its measures, nothing changes in the U.S. Let us say, people like me respond, but we don't change the society. And the President continues his programs, and Congress does not effectively oppose him. All right, first of all I want to agree with you. I put aside the possibility. Certain of your contingencies I will eliminate. President Reagan, I do not believe, will

change his stance in the next year and a half. Any President, I think, other than Reagan, will be somewhat more receptive, at least to talking. I don't think you'll get another President who will refuse to discuss a test ban, as Reagan does. We'll put it right there. But, of course, that's not enough. You could easily get another President who talked, but didn't make any agreement. That is certainly possible. Next, you could certainly get a Congress that talked about, or made resolutions, stopping the money, but did not provide enough votes to stop it, especially against a Presidential veto. I think you may well get by next Spring, votes against funding for testing. And Reagan's intransigence will encourage that. But the President could veto that, and to get a 2/3 against that might be very difficult, so the funding goes on. What, then, happens?

Well, first of all, I will also eliminate that the U.S. achieves a genuinely adequate first strike force. It's just not possible, for two reasons. I think you took a premise that the Soviets, for reasons that I found acceptable, stopped building entirely whatever the U.S. did. I must say I will reject the possibility that the Soviet Union will do that. I am not here in the Soviet Union to bring about a situation in which the Soviets stop building, and the U.S. builds forever, even if I thought that was desireable. If I had advised Brezhnev in'64 not to imitate the U.S., I don't really expect I would have succeeded, even if I thought I was right. So I would have hoped that I could convince him that he should try harder for a test ban, than they actually did. You know that a freeze was once offered by one super power before 1980? How many people know when that was?

MAN: Glassboro?

ELLSBERG: No, it was not in Glassboro. In fact, there was no discussion in Glassboro of offensive limits, only defensive. Glassboro was in '67, right? '64, Johnson offered a freeze in '64. Transparently, meant to be rejected, you might say. The Soviets then were enormously inferior in numbers. And, by the way, they didn't have hardened missiles, and silos. Obviously, he meant it to be rejected, or if they had accepted, it would freeze American superiority. Now, by '64, the Soviets had hundreds .....

MAN: [INAUDIBLE]

ELLSBERG: What? Actually Johnson did -- I have it back home, but I don't remember all the details -- it is the case though. You can find this out, I'm sure, that Johnson did offer a freeze in '64. It's not known very widely. I only learned it recently, in the last year. I was very surprised to learn it.

Now, why hadn't I heard it? Well, because nothing came of it. It was meant to be rejected, and if it had not been rejected would have given us great numerical superiority. It should have been accepted. It would have been enormously better than anything that happened later, even though it was inferior. You would have missed all these advantages of parody, all the advantages of equality. I don't have the impression that those have really bought you a whole lot, to tell the truth, as far as I can see.

But, anyway, back to this point. The truth is, I don't expect either side to stop indefinitely while the other continues, either.

So that's not really what we're talking about. At most, I'm talking about initiatives which, like the ones you're doing right now, and not just for six months, but, truthfully, the other side, especially Congress, doesn't react in six months. If you should ask, "How long should we wait for Congress to respond?" I would ask you, "How long has it taken over here for the new way of thinking to emerge in the bureaucracy?" Now, there's no question when the new man comes in with the new way of thinking, the bureaucracy sees the light very much faster than in other circumstances. But, still, how long has it taken this to move up here? And it won't take shorter in the U.S.

So that brings us past Reagan. I am saying, then, that even though Reagan will not respond in time, and Congress may not respond enough in time, that the current moves that I'm proposing are for the longer run. Especially after Reagan, and not right away. If there is strength in Congress for cutting off the funds, I think that would very greatly improve the chances of the next President, which is only two years off, actually achieving a test ban. I won't go through the whole analysis, but let me give an example of a couple kind of things.

If it's Bush, he will not want a test ban. But I'm saying, Congress might give him one, whether he likes it or not. If it's a Democrat, the actual movement that is building might lead the President to want a test ban. Mondale was not keen on a test ban, truthfully. But under the pressure of the freeze movement, he did commit himself to a test ban, and even, I'll bet you never heard this, and almost no Americans have ever heard this. Mondale committed himself under pressure of the freeze movement, and I helped write this, to a platform that said that his first day in office he would inact not only a moratorium on the testing

of warheads, and call on the Soviets to join him, he would call for a moratorium on the flight testing of new missiles. How many people here knew that Mondale had said that? One?

[BACKGROUND COMMENTS. LAUGHTER]

ELLSBERG: No, he didn't mention it on the debate! Which was the first time we realized that things were not going well for us. But he had earlier committd himself, almost no Americans knew that.

WOMAN: Was it because of the anti-war press?

ELLSBERG: That was under pressure. So what I'm saying is, now,

Mondale was not an anti-war President. In fact, no candidate, other than
perhaps Cranston, who wasn't a serious candidate, no candidate was

truthfully an anti-nuclear candidate. We're not likely to get one,

though it's not impossible. But I'm saying, even a cold warrior, like

Mondale, did respond to the freeze movement enough. And that movement

still exists, as I say, they're discouraged at things. But he did

respond enough to actually produce a committment to do it. So that is a

possibility. And, of course, another very real possibility is, that

despite all these efforts by the Soviet Union, within reason, the

limited time efforts that extend over two or three years -- remember,

don't be shocked -- but I really am saying something like three years

here at a minimum, that carries us beyond Reagan into the first year of

a next Presidency, at a minimum. Well, that sounds like a lot, though,

actually, it's no longer than between '82, when I suggested a moratorium

here, as a small minority, and three years later when they had a moratorium. So, we're talking time intervals like that.

Another possibility is that despite everything the Soviets do, the U.S. industrial-military complex, and, I will say, heretically here, and I don't expect almost anyone here to agree with me, a military-industrial complex in the Soviet Union whose motives and interests are not exactly the same as those in the U.S., but whose behavior looks remarkably similar to an outsider. The outcome of the Black Box looks regrettably similar when it comes to making errors that involve making new weapons instead of new arms control proposals. Anyway, let's put that aside. I don't need to get into that particular argument.

Let's just put it on the U.S. I'm willing to do that in this context entirely. Let's suppose that your new leader has used the strength of the Soviet system, which does exist, to impose Party discipline on the military in a way that is not easily possible in the U.S. So that that aspect of the Soviet system shows its best side, mainly, when the leader gets a good idea, he can get it implemented more easily than in the U.S. And the Soviets do what I would like them to do. It is possible that Congress, the public, the new President, fail to respond to any of this, do build the D-5, do build the MX in great numbers, go through the anti-satellite moratorium and continue to build anti-satellite weapons, do build not a perfect SDI, which is physically impossible, but a dangerous SDI, which is physically possible, that is possible. I would say in that case, by the way, the next step would be the Soviets would begin to re-build. Even then I would hope they would avoid the past failure of immitating these developments, and making the worse situation. But they'll build. The world will not -- whatever the Soviets

do will not totally, in my opinion, compensate for the dangers of what the U.S. is doing -- so the world becomes more dangerous. I'm talking five and ten years from now. Destruction does not become certain in any fixed period of time, but increasingly likely, accumlatively likely, much more likely than at present, intolerably likely. I believe that is the most likely trajectory. I do not believe it is very likely that humanity will survive the invention of nuclear weapons. I believe the outcome, shown in that movie, is the most likely outcome, of "Notes From A Dead Man." Despite the build-up of forces on both sides, which reassures many sincere, informed people on both sides, that the world is stable no matter what anybody does. I would like to believe that. And they're very respectable, important people. Herb York, on my side, many scientists on your side. I happen to think they are wrong. I know something they don't know, though they know many things I don't know. They know about designing nuclear weapons. They know about the process of developing much more than I know. I do know the proclivity of U.S. leaders for threatening nuclear weapons better than they know. And if U.S. leaders can do that, that means I am not totally assured that Soviets can never do it, or that, it doesn't take a mad Quadaffi, as we think of him over there. It doesn't take a madman in the world of proliferation, which we've said nothing about, obviously another whole subject here. It takes, in my opinion, only leaders no more mad than those that the U.S. has elected. Or the leaders who got us preparing for World War I, and exploded World War I. Now, I've said something very pessimistic, but notice it is not fatalistic. It is not fatalistic. I have not said, and I do not believe this is certain, that I think it's likely we will go in that direction, but even so it could be undone.

I'm saying it is not certain. We have a chance. The chance is, thanks to Gorbachev, I can say, growing this year compared to two years ago. By our efforts in the anti-war movement, by your efforts here of analysis, we can enlarge that chance. And I think that is our responsibility.

MAN: Are there any more questions?.....Well, by way of concluding, let me quote Antonio Gromshy, who once described a true revolutionary as somebody who has the intellect and the optimism of the will. I think this is a very good description of what kind of think is required in this day of ours, and that's the crux of the new thinking in this country, in our new leadership. And we hope that we will benefit. We don't have to agree with everything that is said here, but I can assure you that we will think it over, we will discuss it. And we thank you for this very interesting and deep and provoking lecture of yours.

ELLSBERG: Can I thank you for what you've just said, what I just heard? It may reflect only my ignorance, but let me report to you that I did not expect to hear Gromshy quoted in Moscow. And that may be my ignorance. I am a student of Gromshy, to some extent, and have learned from it. But I had the impression that it has been every year in the U.S.S.R. that, am I wrong, that Gromshy would have been quoted.

MAN: Gromshy is considered one of the greatest Marxist thinkers.

ELLSBERG: That was true twenty years ago. It really was? Well, that's

my ignorance then.

MAN: And his works are published, and they're quoted.

ELLSBERG: Well, I was taking specific hope from that, but apparently, there was more basis for hope all along than I realized. [LAUGHS]

MAN: By the way, I must apologize. I haven't introduced to you,

Margaret Gibson, another well known peace activist who also was a

participant in those actions at the testing sites. And I apologize for

not doing that. Thank you very much.

[SHUFFLE OF PEOPLE RISING FROM CHAIRS.]

MAN: Mr. Ellsberg, it might sound a little bit strange to you, but would it be possible if at all to count on you helping me or us, rather. We are working presently on the United States Encyclopedia, in two volumes. Certainly an article on Daniel Ellsberg is supposed to be there. I lack your curriculum vitae, so if you have a spare copy, or if you could write it down for me. Certainly I don't see anyone who might describe as well as you yourself.

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